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JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS:
A MISCHIEVOUS CONCEPT
— by Neil E. Harl*
Most wills are executed by one person and may be
amended, revised or revoked at any time prior to the
testator's death.1  Occasionally, use is made of wills that are
"joint" in that the instrument is signed by two or more
individuals (usually spouses) and contains in one document
the testamentary bequests of each testator.2  Such wills are,
in effect, the separate wills of each of the testators and can
be revised or revoked by any of the testators as to that
person's property.3
Wills that are both "joint" and "mutual" contain a
contractual obligation that binds the parties to dispose of
their properties that are subject to the contractual obligation
according to the terms of the will.4  The contractual feature
becomes binding at the death of the first testator to die; the
surviving testator's interest is effectively reduced to a life
estate with the remainder interest passing to the
beneficiaries named in the will.5
Possible gift
If the ability of the surviving testator to consume,
convey or dispose of the property after the death of the first
testator to die is constrained by the terms of the will or by
state law, the surviving testator may be deemed to have
made a completed gift of the remainder interest in that
surviving testator's property at the death of the first spouse
to die.6  On the other hand, if the surviving testator is
subject to few constraints on disposition of the property
after the death of the first testator to die, there may not be a
gift of the remainder interest to the beneficiaries under the
will.7  Thus, a contractual promise to transfer an indefinite
amount of property at one's death is not a gift for federal
gift tax purposes.8  If the surviving testator has a general or
special power of appointment over the remainder, that may
preclude a completed gift at the death of the first testator to
die.
Effect on marital deduction
If the decedent wishes to claim a marital deduction, the
property interest passing to the surviving spouse does not
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qualify for the marital deduction if the spouse is bound by
contract to dispose of the interest in favor of a third person.9
However, a marital deduction has been allowed in joint
tenancy property even though subject to a joint and mutual
will.10  The courts, in general, have allowed the marital
deduction for nonprobate property but not for probate
property.11  Thus, an interest bequeathed to a surviving
spouse under a joint and mutual will may not be eligible for
the marital deduction.12
In a recent letter ruling,13 a West Virginia decedent had
executed a joint will with the surviving spouse. The will
provided that all real and personal property passed to the
survivor who had the power to sell, convey, use or dispose
of the property for any purpose and that any remaining
property at the survivor’s death was to pass to the children.
The surviving spouse disclaimed a portion of the estate
property equivalent to the amount necessary to use the
unified credit and any other credits. The IRS ruled that
under West Virginia law, the surviving spouse had the
power to appoint the property to anyone; therefore, the
estate property passing under the joint will was eligible for
the marital deduction.
Inclusion in survivor's estate
Arguably, if the surviving spouse only has a "mere life
estate" after the death of the first spouse to die, that spouse
would have a granted life estate as to property previously
owned by the first spouse to die and the property would not
be included in the surviving spouse's estate.  On the other
hand, for property owned by the surviving spouse before the
death of the first spouse to die, the surviving spouse would
have a retained life estate which would be fully taxable in
the survivor's estate.  Property owned by the spouses in
tenancy in common would appear to be subject to a retained
life estate and a granted life estate in the respective portions.
Obviously, this would have important implications for
provisions such as special use valuation, also.14
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally Note, "Recent Developments of the Iowa
Law of Joint and Mutual Wills," 44 Iowa L. Rev. 523
(1959).
2 See United States v. Ford, 377 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir.
1967).
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3 See note, supra n. 1.
4 See, e.g., Pyle v. United States, 766 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
5 See Pyle v. United States, n. 4 supra.
6 Pyle v. United States, n. 4 supra (significant constraints
imposed on freedom of surviving spouse to dispose of
property); Grimes v. Comm'r, 851 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir.
1988).
7 Estate of Lidbury v. Comm’r, 800 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'g, 84 T.C. 146 (1985).
8 Hambleton v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 558, 565 (1973), acq. in
result, 1974-1 C.B. 1.
9 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a).
10 Estate of Awtry v. Comm’r, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.
1955).  See Ford v. United States, 377 F.2d 93 (8th Cir.
1967) (joint tenancy property and life insurance
proceeds).
11 Ford v. United States, supra n. 10.
12 Estate of Grimes v. Comm’r, 91-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,078
(7th Cir. 1991) (under Illinois law, survivor under joint
and mutual will receives only equivalent of life estate);
Ltr. Rul. 9023004, February 20, 1990 (Texas law); Ltr.
Rul. 9101002, September 20, 1990 (surviving spouse
had mere life estate).
13 Ltr. Rul. 94350014, June 2, 1994.
14 See I.R.C. § 2032A.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AMENDMENTS. At the time of the bankruptcy
petition, the debtor was a plaintiff in a personal injury
action but the debtor did not list the action on the
bankruptcy asset schedules nor did the debtor claim the
action as an exemption. Once the trustee learned about the
action, the trustee retained counsel to litigate the action and
eventually settled the case for a cash award. The debtor then
filed an amendment to the exemptions to include the
proceeds of the settlement as exempt. The trustee argued
that once the trustee had liquidated an estate asset, the
debtor could not claim the asset as exempt. The court held
that the debtor could claim the proceeds of the settlement as
exempt but that the trustee would be allowed to deduct the
cost of procuring the settlement. In re Fournier, 169 B.R.
282 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN. The debtor owned a one-fourth interest in a
ranch as a tenant in common. The other interests were held
by nondebtors, the debtor’s mother and sister. The ranch
was operated by the owners as a partnership. The owners
were comakers of a loan from the SBA, secured by two
mortgages on the ranch which did not exceed the fair
market value of the entire ranch. The SBA filed a claim in
the debtor’s case for the entire amount owed. The Chapter
12 plan provided for the SBA to retain its first lien position
on a portion of the land but subordinated the lien as to
another portion of the land to a judgment lien held by
another creditor. The debtor argued that the SBA loan was
oversecured because the value of the claim was only one-
third of the fair market value of the ranch. The court held
that the determination of the secured status of the SBA
claim was to be made using only the value of the debtor’s
interest in the ranch. Because the claim was at least equal to
the debtor’s interest in the ranch, the SBA claim was not
oversecured and any change in the SBA claim made by the
plan would impair the claim impermissably under Section
1225(a)(5). In re Beach, 169 B.R. 201 (D. Kan. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PROPERTY TAXES. The Chapter 13 debtor owned
real property in Maryland against which real estate taxes
became first due during the bankruptcy case. The real estate
taxes were prospective, i.e., the 1994-1995 taxes became
first due on July 1, 1994. The debtor’s plan did not provide
for payment of the taxes and had not been confirmed when
the county filed a claim for the taxes after July 1, 1994. The
court noted that had no claim been filed, the taxes were a
post-petition claim not required to be paid under the plan
and would not be dischargeable. In addition, the court noted
that if the tax claim had not been filed, the taxes could have
been assessed against the debtor as soon as the plan was
confirmed and the real property reverted to the debtor.
However, because the county filed a claim for taxes arising
post-petition, under Section 1305, the tax claim was to be
treated as having arisen pre-petition and allowed as a claim,
was subject to the automatic stay and was subject to
discharge. Baffled as to why the county would subject its
tax claim to these limitations, the court allowed the county
to clarify its filing or withdraw it. In re Reamy, 169 B.R.
352 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
   CLAIMS. The IRS filed a priority claim for employment
taxes and an unsecured claim for penalties nine months after
the bar date for filing claims in the Chapter 7 case. The
trustee objected to the claims as untimely filed. The court
held that priority tax claims need only be filed pre-
distribution to be allowed in Chapter 7 cases unless the
claimant was guilty of inequitable conduct but that the
unsecured claim would not be allowed because it was
untimely filed. The court also held that the failure of the
IRS to timely file the claim was not inequitable because the
debtor did not provide its employment identification
number with the notice of the case to the IRS. In re Bunce,
169 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1994).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 case and listed federal
employment tax claims. Notice of the case and the bar date
for filing claims was sent to the IRS but not the U.S.
Attorney’s office. The IRS failed to file a claim until after
the claims bar date and the trustee sought to disallow the
